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FIXING THE UNFIXABLE: COMMUNITY PROSECUTION AS A 
PROBLEM-SOLVING STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME AND 
RESTORE ORDER IN EAST ST. LOUIS 
INTRODUCTION 
East St. Louis, Illinois, is the worst place in America. . . . The unique horror of 
East St. Louis is its isolation, it is unrelievedly awful in every particular. . . . 
Physically it is right in the middle of America. In every other way, it might as 
well have dropped off the map.1 
During the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Americans watched with concern 
as crime in cities across the country escalated with no end in sight.2 After 
decades of watching cities decay from a confluence of economic and social 
forces, many Americans started to believe that criminals, not law-abiding 
citizens or the government, controlled the country’s urban core.3 In response, 
criminal justice theorists began to reconsider their long-held beliefs about the 
most effective strategies for fighting crime. They began to challenge the old 
criminal justice paradigm where police passively “respond[ed] to crime” and 
prosecutors “process[ed] the ensuing cases.”4 Criminal justice officials 
throughout the country—most notably New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani 
and Police Commissioners Howard Safir and William Bratton—began an 
aggressive strategy to implement new, more proactive police tactics.5 
Concurrently, many district, county, and state attorneys developed a new 
model for prosecuting criminals by increasing their focus on crime reduction 
 
 1. SIMON HOGGART, AMERICA: A USER’S GUIDE 55, 58 (1990). 
 2. Kelley B. Gray, Community Prosecution: After Two Decades, Still New Frontiers, 32 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 199, 199 (2008). 
 3. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS 
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 1 (1996) [hereinafter FIXING 
BROKEN WINDOWS].  See MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, A 25-
YEAR QUAGMIRE: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN SOCIETY 1 (2007) 
(discussing the 1980s war on crime and drugs). 
 4. See Catherine M. Coles & George L. Kelling, Prevention Through Community 
Prosecution, 136 PUB. INT. 69, 70 (1999) [hereinafter Prevention Through Community 
Prosecution]. 
 5. Id. at 70–71. 
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and prevention.6 The new movement, coined “community prosecution,” 
fundamentally challenged the old prosecution paradigm.7 
Although academics and criminal justice officials debate the true definition 
of community prosecution,8 prosecutors have defined the strategy as “a 
proactive approach to addressing crime and quality-of-life issues that brings 
prosecutors together with residents to identify problems and solutions.”9 As 
part of the movement, prosecutors have re-focused the traditional prosecutorial 
model from a system of case-processing concerned with the adjudication of 
cases after crime occurs to a system where prosecutors work with community 
partners to prevent crime and build social order before crime occurs.10 From 
the outset of the movement in the early 1990s to 2005, two-thirds of all 
prosecutors across the country implemented community prosecution in at least 
some form, but they implemented the core strategies to varying degrees and for 
different reasons.11 Although prosecutors differ in focus and implementation of 
their community prosecution activities, their efforts typify a new understanding 
 
 6. Id. at 73. 
 7. Id. As Deputy Attorney General in 2001, current Attorney General Eric Holder lauded 
the development of community prosecution programs and appreciated the revolutionary 
implications of the new strategy. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Community Prosecution, U.S. ATT’YS’ 
BULL., Jan. 2001, at 3 (characterizing community prosecution as “not another name for doing 
business as usual . . . [and] not simply a new program . . . [but] a strategy, a better way for 
prosecutors to be doing their job.”). 
 8. Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
321, 323 (2002) (pondering what community prosecution “actually means”). At the early stages 
of the community prosecution movement, a focus group of prosecutors, researchers, and 
government officials set out to define community prosecution. Norma Mancini Stevens, Talking 
Points: Defining Community Prosecution, PROSECUTOR, Mar.–Apr. 1994, at 13. They concluded 
that community prosecution is “a long term proactive strategy involving a partnership among the 
prosecutor’s office, law enforcement, the community, and [community] organizations whereby 
the authority of the prosecutor’s office is used to solve problems and improve public safety and 
the quality of life in an identified community.” Id. 
 9. M. ELAINE NUGENT ET AL., AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., THE CHANGING 
NATURE OF PROSECUTION: COMMUNITY PROSECUTION VS. TRADITIONAL PROSECUTION 
APPROACHES 1 (2004) [hereinafter CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION], available at http:// 
www.ndaa.org/pdf/changing_nature_of_prosecution.pdf. 
 10. M. ELAINE NUGENT, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO 
PRACTICE COMMUNITY PROSECUTION? 3–7 (2004) [hereinafter WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO 
PRACTICE COMMUNITY PROSECUTION?], available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/what_does_mean 
_practice_cp.pdf (arguing that community prosecution focuses on a “grass-roots approach to 
justice” with the goal of solving problems and addressing concerns of the community while the 
case-processing model focuses on “individualized justice” with the goal of disposing of a case in 
the most efficient and equitable manner). 
 11. STEVEN W. PERRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 9 
(2006). 
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in criminal justice: prosecutors must be “less reactive and more participatory in 
relation to the communities with which—and in which—they operate.”12 
After decades of escalating violent crime rates, prosecutors in St. Clair 
County, Illinois, recently changed the focus of their prosecution strategy from 
a model based almost exclusively on case-processing to a model that 
incorporates community prosecution.13 Across the Mississippi River from St. 
Louis, Missouri, St. Clair County contains quintessential industrial suburbs 
that have struggled to keep up as industries have downsized or closed in post-
manufacturing America.14 The city of East St. Louis clearly exemplifies that 
struggle.15 Considered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
in 1989 to be the “most distressed small city in America,” East St. Louis 
suffers from extraordinary poverty16 and, by some measures, the highest per 
capita violent crime rate in the nation.17 To combat St. Clair County’s “crime 
epidemic,” prosecutors developed a unique community prosecution strategy 
founded upon ideas employed in various cities and counties across the 
country.18 
Because St. Clair County prosecutors only recently began this experiment, 
criminal justice theorists and prosecutors alike must take the opportunity to 
assess the effectiveness of community prosecution in an attempt to cater the 
most effective elements of the approach to benefit the East St. Louis 
community. This Article will first discuss how community prosecution differs 
from the traditional prosecutorial model. Second, this Article will provide a 
brief evolution of the movement, with a particular focus on the theoretical 
 
 12. Thompson, supra note 8, at 322–23. According to an early report by the United States 
Department of Justice, community prosecution strategies represented a “major milestone in 
changing the culture and role of the prosecutor by developing [community] partnerships” and 
employing problem-solving approaches to fundamental problems. JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY PROSECUTION STRATEGIES xi (2003). 
 13. Interview with Brendan Kelly, St. Clair Cnty. State’s Attorney, in Belleville, Ill. (Jan. 13, 
2012) [hereinafter Kelly Interview]. 
 14. See ANDREW J. THEISING, EAST ST. LOUIS: MADE IN THE USA 7–11 (2003). Professor 
Theising offers a compelling discussion of East St. Louis as the embodiment of the traditional 
industrial suburb in which the nearby major city uses the community as a “work-bench, a trash 
heap, [and] a washbasin.” Id. at 8. Much like Camden, New Jersey, and Gary, Indiana, East St. 
Louis is “[a] kind of repository for the unattractive yet essential elements of urban life,” home to 
the “slaughterhouses, smoke-stacks, [and] rail yards” that serve the St. Louis metropolitan area. 
Id. 
 15. Id. at 11. 
 16. JENNIFER F. HAMER, ABANDONED IN THE HEARTLAND: WORK, FAMILY, & LIVING IN 
EAST ST. LOUIS 52 (2011). 
 17. DENNIS MARES, PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPATIAL 
HOMICIDE PATTERNS IN EAST ST. LOUIS, IL 2000-2010, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter SPATIAL 
HOMICIDE PATTERNS]. 
 18. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
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foundation on which the strategy rests—the “broken windows theory.”19 Third, 
this Article will discuss commonly accepted community prosecution strategies 
and tactics, providing some examples of how and where they have been 
successfully implemented. Finally, this Article will discuss the strategies of 
prosecutors in St. Clair County, Illinois, and argue that the community 
prosecution approach can be targeted to reduce crime and restore order in East 
St. Louis—a city that has suffered from adherence to the traditional case-
processing model of prosecution. 
I.  COMMUNITY PROSECUTION: A CHALLENGE TO THE OLD PROSECUTORIAL 
MODEL 
As the Supreme Court has observed, “the American prosecutor” plays a 
special role “in the search for truth in criminal trials.”20 The prosecutor is: 
the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal 
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.21 
While most Americans understand justice in the abstract, their understanding 
of a prosecutor’s role in serving the interest of justice remains vague at best.22 
Prosecutors formally represent the people in the courtroom, but at trial, the 
prosecutor arguably serves the government, as an enforcement arm against the 
people.23 In fact, many prosecutors view “enforcing the criminal law” as a 
singular function: prosecuting those individuals who have allegedly violated 
criminal law statutes.24 This view—the traditional view of a prosecutor’s 
 
 19. See generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The police and 
neighborhood safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/4465/. But see Bernard 
E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City & a Five-City 
Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 272 (2006) (arguing that evidence is mixed, at best, 
as to the validity of the broken windows theory and the benefit of the subsequent change in 
policing strategy). Despite this criticism and that of others, the researchers behind the “broken 
windows” theory still argue that the “broken windows” approach works. See George L. Kelling, 
‘Broken Windows’ Works, FORBES.COM (July 16, 2009, 3:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/ 
07/16/crime-disorder-punishment-opinions-contributors-george-kelling.html (pointing to two 
studies, one done in the Netherlands and one in Lowell, Massachusetts, seeming to confirm that 
where police maintain order, “Broken-Windows style,” crime drops and does not simply move to 
adjacent neighborhoods). 
 20. Stickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). 
 21. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 22. Thompson, supra note 8, at 327. 
 23. Id. at 327–28 (arguing that in a world of limited resources, prosecutors must act in 
accordance with the priorities of their funding authorities, which in turn “limit[s] whom 
prosecutors actually serve”). 
 24. See DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED HAGEN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 2 (1982). 
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role—represents a pragmatic solution to the problem of crime, given the 
extraordinary caseload of most prosecutors.25 
The traditional model of prosecution developed in the 1960s was part of a 
major transformation of the criminal justice system.26 President Johnson’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 
(“Commission”) released a report entitled The Challenge of Crime in a Free 
Society that spurred the new model.27 In an attempt to “professionalize” 
criminal justice, the Commission characterized prosecutors as “case processors 
who focused on moving offenders through the criminal justice system from 
arrest to incarceration.”28 The Commission found that citizens could help 
police and prosecutors, but only by reporting crimes and acting as witnesses, 
because responding to crime was the job of criminal justice professionals.29 
As a result of these reforms, prosecutors became exclusively concerned 
with attaining convictions in serious felony cases.30 If prosecutors secured a 
jury verdict or negotiated a guilty plea, they could then point to tangible 
evidence that their criminal justice strategy had succeeded.31 The resulting 
press coverage built the public perception that convictions curb crime and 
serve the interest of justice.32 However, under this model, prosecutors did not 
develop their caseloads actively.33 Rather, they passively processed their cases 
by operating exclusively within the framework laid out by police.34 Moreover, 
prosecutors showed little concern for “minor” quality-of-life issues, such as 
vandalism and prostitution, because these “less serious” offenses required 
 
 25. Thompson, supra note 8, at 327, 331. 
 26. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 69. 
 27. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). Elite members of the judiciary, academia, 
and government conducted a comprehensive study of crime and law enforcement and made more 
than one hundred recommendations for reform. Charles J. Hynes, The Evolving Prosecutor: 
Broadening the Vision, Expanding the Role, CRIM. JUST., SPRING 2009, at 1. 
 28. Hynes, supra note 27, at 1. 
 29. FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 3, at 82 (arguing that during this time, 
“[p]olicing was police business and, as such, best left in the hands of professionals”). 
 30. See Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public 
Accountability: The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor 10 (Weiner Ctr. for Soc. 
Policy, John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 00-02-04, 2000), 
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.91.2361; see also FIXING 
BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 3, at 11–12 (“Scholars and practitioners . . . focused almost 
exclusively on ‘serious’ crimes—those that appear most severe and consequential for the 
victim—murder, rape, robbery, assault, and burglary.”). 
 31. Thompson, supra note 8, at 331. 
 32. Id. 
 33. WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO PRACTICE COMMUNITY PROSECUTION?, supra note 10, at 7. 
 34. See id. 
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more work and resulted in less tangible evidence that prosecutors were 
attaining “justice” and winning the “war” against crime.35 
Over time, the obsessive focus on conviction rates fundamentally altered 
the criminal justice system.36 Prosecutors operating within the traditional case-
processing framework developed one goal—to convict criminals—and did not 
involve outside parties unless those individuals could help prove their case 
against a defendant.37 Case-processing prosecutors even viewed the victim as 
merely an instrument for constructing that case, rather than a teammate in the 
fight against crime and the primary beneficiary of “justice” being served.38 
These prosecutors rejected calls to work with other partners, notably social 
service agencies, mental health centers, and faith-based organizations, because 
collaboration with others diverted attention from the prosecutor’s “real job.”39 
Under the case-processing model of prosecution, attaining “justice” meant 
achieving convictions, and nothing else. 
The singular focus on achieving convictions for serious crime led to a 
reduced confidence amongst the community in the role of the prosecutor.40 As 
then-Assistant Attorney General Eric Holder argued in 2001, “many citizens 
think of [case-processing prosecutors] as perhaps indifferent, or even uncaring 
as to the problems they [see] and live[] with in [sic] their neighborhoods.”41 
 
 35. See Heike Gramckow, Community Prosecution in the United States, 5 EUR. J. ON CRIM. 
POL’Y & RES. 9, 14 (1997) (recognizing that before the introduction of community prosecution 
strategies, minor quality-of-life crimes received scant attention); see also Devin J. Doolan, Jr., 
Comment, Community Prosecution: A Revolution in Crime Fighting, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 547, 
547–48 (2002) (finding that these quality-of-life offenses resulted in little or no sanctions under 
the traditional criminal justice system because many prosecutors thought they were best left to 
social workers). The neglect of “minor” crimes within the traditional prosecutorial framework 
could also be a consequence of the culture of prosecutors’ offices where many attorneys choose 
careers in the field to lock up “bad guys,” but when the “bad guy” is merely a street peddler, 
vagrant, or homeless person on the street, some prosecutors may be reluctant to accept the less 
glamorous role devised under the community prosecution model. See Susan P. Weinstein, 
Community Prosecution: Community Policing’s Legal Partner, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., 
Apr. 1998, at 22. See Kit R. Roane, Designing a War Against Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1997, 
at 13. 
 36. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and 
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1997) (arguing that the beneficial effects of the post-1960 
“constitutionalization” of criminal procedure has been limited by broad substantive criminal law 
(i.e., over-criminalization) that allows the state to scale back fundamentals of criminal procedure 
because of very high crime-to-prosecutor ratios and a focus on attaining convictions). 
 37. Thompson, supra note 8, at 332–33. 
 38. Id. (arguing that victims are viewed in “instrumental terms as a vehicle for telling the 
prosecution’s side of the story rather than a teammate who should be consulted on important 
decisions regarding the case”). 
 39. Id. at 335. 
 40. Doolan, supra note 35, at 548. 
 41. Holder, Jr., supra note 7, at 4. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] FIXING THE UNFIXABLE 163 
Citizens care about serious crime, but they also care about other crimes—in 
addition to serious crime.42 However, over a period of several decades, case-
processing prosecutors only considered serious crime important.43 The lack of 
action on the so-called “minor” offenses led segments of the population to 
believe that the government did not operate to serve the community.44 Those in 
overlooked neighborhoods and communities—those most susceptible to urban 
decay—became the most distrustful of the system.45 In the end, prosecutors’ 
attempts at attaining “justice” exclusively through the conviction of serious 
crime led to a growing sense of vulnerability amongst law-abiding citizens that 
threatened to derail the entire criminal justice system.46 
II.  BROKEN WINDOWS: A REFORMATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
After decades of escalating crime, a new theory—”broken windows”—
revolutionized the way experts thought about crime. First introduced in an 
article by James Q. Wilson and George E. Kelling in 1982, the theory drew a 
connection between disorderly conduct and citizens’ fears of “minor” crime.47 
As George Kelling witnessed one of urban America’s numerous—and 
infamous—open-air drug markets, he came to a profound conclusion: The law-
abiding citizens who witnessed the public drug activity each and every day 
realized who controlled the neighborhood.48 Despite years of increased efforts 
to reduce violence amidst a “war” on serious crime, neither citizens nor the 
government controlled the streets. Drug dealers did—and the neighborhood 
knew it. As in many parts of urban America, the citizens had lost faith in the 
government’s ability to address their concerns and restore order in their 
community.49 In response, Kelling and Wilson developed a revolutionary 
approach to criminal justice that addressed the “amalgam of disorder, fear, 
serious crime, and urban decay” and focused on “minor” crime in addition to 
“serious” crime.50 
 
 42. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 75. 
 43. Id. at 70. 
 44. Weinstein, supra note 35, at 21–22 (arguing that residents see prosecutors as “enemies in 
business suits who send friends and loved ones to jail.”). 
 45. Doolan, supra note 35, at 556. 
 46. Weinstein, supra note 35, at 21–22 (noting that community residents could be a 
“roadblock” to the success of community prosecution in a target area if they are suspicious of 
prosecutors); Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 73 (quoting an 
attorney who feared that if his office did not change criminal justice strategies, the community 
“would come to despise [his] office . . . and . . . tend to blame [failures] on [him]”). 
 47. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 19, at 32–33. 
 48. FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
 49. Id. at 2 (arguing that the witnesses to rampant and open crime often see “governmental 
authority as a bad joke”). 
 50. Id. at 5. 
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A. Link Between Low-Level Disorder & Serious Crime 
The broken windows theory rests on a simple proposition: 
At the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in 
a kind of developmental sequence. Social psychologists and police officers 
tend to agree that if a window in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all 
the rest of the windows will soon be broken. . . . [O]ne unrepaired broken 
window is a signal that no one cares, and so breaking more windows costs 
nothing.51 
The theory does not posit that it is inevitable that serious crime will 
flourish from a mere broken window; but rather, over time, many residents will 
think that crime is on the rise when they begin to believe that others do not 
care about the upkeep of the community.52 Residents will change their 
behavior, and become less involved.53 This lack of involvement will make the 
community susceptible to criminal invasion.54 
Wilson and Kelling argued that drug dealers, prostitutes, and other 
criminals fill the void left by disinvolvement and begin to control the streets: 
The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window. Muggers and 
robbers, whether opportunistic or professional, believe they reduce their 
chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on streets where 
potential victims are already intimidated by prevailing conditions. If the 
neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, 
the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a 
potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes place.55 
Criminal actors prey on neighborhoods with untended property (i.e., derelict 
houses, unkept lawns, and graffiti) and untended behavior (i.e., unsupervised 
children, vagrants, and drunks roaming the streets) because “informal [social] 
 
 51. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 19, at 31. 
 52. Id. at 32. 
 53. Id. at 32 (“[Residents] will use the streets less often, and when on the streets will stay 
apart from their fellows, moving with averted eyes, silent lips, and hurried steps. . . . For some 
residents, this growing atomization will matter little, because the neighborhood is not their 
‘home’ but ‘the place where they live.’”). The broken windows theorists found that residents in a 
neighborhood overtaken by disorder will often stop calling the police because “they can’t do 
anything.” Id. at 33. 
 54. Id. at 32. 
 55. Id. at 34. But see ADAM CRAWFORD, CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY: 
POLITICS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 133 (1998) (arguing that vagrants, drug abusers, etc. are the 
results and victims of neighborhood change, not the cause); Leena Kurki, Restorative and 
Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME & JUST. 235, 289 (2000) (“[The] [b]roken 
windows theory contributes to the idea that marginalized youth, prostitutes, alcohol and drug 
addicts, beggars, and vagrants are authors of decline rather than its victims.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] FIXING THE UNFIXABLE 165 
controls” do not regulate public behavior and set a standard that is understood 
by the entire community.56 
In contrast, stable neighborhoods consist of families who care about their 
homes, mind each other’s children, and confidently frown on unwanted 
intruders.57 Unlike in disorderly neighborhoods, criminals know that residents 
will help enforce social order based on informal, yet accepted, community 
standards: “the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility.”58 
Criminals cannot hide behind the veil of anonymity because the community 
considers their conduct to be out of place and unacceptable.59 Stable 
neighborhoods will not become disorderly if community members, in 
conjunction with law enforcement, make efforts to identify problems and 
correct them before they become more serious—before residents give up hope 
and before criminals prey on the lost neighborhood.60 
In simple terms, the broken windows theory developed a link between low-
level disorder and serious crime.61 Kelling and Wilson attempted to offer 
solutions to the all too common concept of “urban decay.”62 In the past, 
residents of neighborhoods teetering on the brink of disorder reasserted control 
over the streets because they had no alternative residences.63 Now, however, 
many people—particularly those with disposable income—can simply move 
somewhere else, usually farther out into the suburbs.64 In the past, police 
focused on maintaining order, and regular citizens played a key role in keeping 
their neighborhoods safe and orderly.65 Over time, police refocused their 
 
 56. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 19, at 31–33. 
 57. Id. at 31. 
 58. See id. at 31–33. 
 59. Id. at 31. 
 60. Id. at 34–36. 
 61. Thompson, supra note 8, at 339 (“The key to deterring serious crime, they argued, 
involved attacking so-called ‘quality-of-life’ crimes.”); Doolan, supra note 35, at 557. 
 62. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 19, at 36, 38. In his portrayal of East St. Louis as the 
epitome of an industrial suburb, Professor Andrew Theising describes East St. Louis’ unique 
“urban decay” as an abandonment of industry that made way for poverty, crime, and corruption. 
THEISING, supra note 14, at 193–99. 
 63. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 19, at 33 (noting that “[a]reas in Chicago, New York, and 
Boston would experience crime and gang wars, and then normalcy would return.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. Professor Debra Livingston argued that police departments stopped focusing on 
maintaining order in neighborhoods because of constitutional reforms in the 1960s and 1970s that 
declared many laws governing vagrancy and loitering void for vagueness. Debra Livingston, 
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New 
Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 585–86 (1997). Moreover, she also warned that giving police 
such tools to restrict disorderliness can lead to an abuse of power, racial discrimination, and even 
police brutality in implementation of these laws. Id. at 663. Similarly, some scholars have argued 
that the “disorder metaphor and intrusions into public space . . . have taken on Orwellian tinges 
and undermine the spirit of community justice.” Kurki, supra note 55, at 289. Even proponents of 
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purpose from one of order maintenance to the exclusive role of fighting serious 
crime.66 Due to these social and criminal justice forces, police and prosecutors 
ignored the important link between social order and serious crime at the 
expense of America’s urban neighborhoods. 
B. New Proactive Approach in Criminal Justice 
In response to widespread acceptance of the broken windows theory, 
police and prosecutors anxiously developed plans to restore order amidst the 
influx of violent crime and urban decay.67 Police and prosecutors imagined a 
new role in criminal justice: as actors in the community who could reinforce 
the informal control mechanisms of the community itself.68 They could not 
provide a substitute for that informal control, but by returning to tactics that 
maintained close links to communities, police and prosecutors could help 
communities re-establish order and rebuild broken neighborhoods.69 Police and 
prosecutors could no longer afford to be passive, reactive agents of criminal 
justice.70 Rather, by taking steps to build community relationships, prevent 
crime, and address important quality of life issues, they could be proactive, 
problem-solving agents of community restoration.71 
III.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY POLICING 
Prior to the development of the broken windows theory, police officers 
focused predominantly on reacting to crime after it was committed.72 The 
police responded to complaints and acted upon those complaints only when 
victims and witnesses were willing to cooperate.73 Most of the time, the police 
simply patrolled neighborhoods or waited at the station to be dispatched to a 
crime scene.74 Police departments emphasized the “three Rs”: rapid response, 
random patrols, and reactive investigation,”75 which effectively “de-policed” 
 
the broken windows theory fear that some police officers can become “agents of neighborhood 
bigotry” and discrimination, but they argue that police selection, training, and supervision can 
establish “a clear sense of the outer limit of [police] discretionary authority.” Wilson & Kelling, 
supra note 19, at 35. 
 66. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 19, at 33–34. 
 67. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 72. 
 68. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 19, at 34. 
 69. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 72. 
 70. Doolan, supra note 35, at 557. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Livingston, supra note 65, at 576 (noting that the police role is “broader, more dynamic 
and more proactive than before” because it is not confined to reactive tactics). 
 73. Thompson, supra note 8, at 339. 
 74. See id.; see also Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 
1593, 1600 (2002) (“The emergency-response number, or 911, [was] the primary mechanism for 
police engagement with citizens . . . .”). 
 75. Meares, supra note 74, at 1599 (quoting WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, 
TURNAROUND: HOW AMERICA’S TOP COP REVERSED THE CRIME EPIDEMIC 81 (1998)). 
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communities by taking officers off streets and placing them on patrol routes so 
that they could cover wider areas.76 Crime prevention became an afterthought 
and, if at all, was only achieved by making arrests.77 
In the late 1980s, the broken windows theory inspired the concept of 
community policing, which integrated crime prevention into everyday police 
tactics.78 Furthermore, an article by University of Wisconsin professor Herman 
Goldstein proposed the idea that police act as “problem-solvers” instead of 
mere “incident reactors.”79 This approach, coupled with the broken windows 
theory, led to the return of a focus on developing and maintaining close links 
between police and communities.80 Police departments began patrolling 
neighborhoods on foot and bicycles; started permanent beats; and decentralized 
control to district commanders, sergeants, and patrol officers.81 Police and 
citizens started working together because their needs and goals were 
congruent.82 Some citizens were suspicious at first, but over time, the police 
developed positive relationships with churches, local political leaders, school 
administrators, and various other community players.83 The resulting 
community-officer partnerships restored trust amongst police and citizens and 
made police more likely to be considered an ally instead of feared as an 
enemy.84 
IV.  FROM COMMUNITY POLICING TO COMMUNITY PROSECUTION 
Realizing the success of community policing and experiencing frustration 
with reactionary crime fighting, prosecutors initiated their own community-
oriented approach to crime called community prosecution.85 Prosecutors hoped 
to stop the “endless routine of imprisoning [criminals] after the fact,” so they 
began to focus on building relationships with actors within the community to 
prevent crime before it occurred.86 For the first time, prosecutors began to 
 
 76. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 71–72. 
 77. FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 3, at 82–85. 
 78. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 339–40. 
 79. Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 236, 236–58 (1979). 
 80. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 72. 
 81. Id.; Coles, supra note 30, at 14. 
 82. FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 3, at 95. 
 83. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 72. 
 84. See FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS, supra note 3, at 96. 
 85. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 72–73; see also Coles, 
supra note 30, at 3 (“[T]he lessons police learned, and their responses nationwide, offered 
powerful examples to prosecutors.”). 
 86. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 73. Arguably, the crack-
cocaine epidemic, and the failure of the criminal justice system to combat it, had more of an 
effect in inspiring prosecutors to change their approach than anything else. Id. at 74–75 (finding 
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reject the sole reliance on the traditional prosecutorial model; they viewed 
crime more broadly, saw themselves as problem-solvers, and recognized that 
serving the community required working within it.87 
Prosecutors recognized that their positions as public leaders inside and 
outside the courtroom made them uniquely positioned to act as agents of 
change in the criminal justice system.88 The American Bar Association’s 
Criminal Justice Standards on the Prosecution Function, approved in 1992, 
noted the importance of the prosecutor’s role as an investigator and case 
processor (the conventional prosecutorial model).89 However, epitomizing the 
new understanding of a prosecutor’s role, the standards also recognized that 
the prosecutor has a broader responsibility as “an administrator of justice” with 
“the duty . . . to seek justice, not merely convict.”90 Importantly, the prosecutor 
has “to seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal justice.”91 
 
that prosecutors in Seattle, Portland, Oklahoma City, Miami, Kansas City, and Brooklyn had to 
employ innovative, aggressive, and multifaceted strategies to combat the drug epidemic). 
 87. Id. at 76–77. According to Jeremy Travis, former Director of the National Institute of 
Justice, “[o]nce police return[ed] to communities, they [were] the magnets that [drew] prosecutors 
into the community as well.” Id. at 73. 
 88. Hynes, supra note 27, at 1–2. For many prosecutors, the development of community 
prosecution was an attempt to assert greater power in a changing criminal justice system where 
police officers, due to the community policing movement, had obtained greater power and 
influence in the eyes of the community. Coles, supra note 30, at 6–7 (noting that prosecutors’ 
offices were “the last of the main agencies of the justice system to develop into a major 
organizational force”). 
 89. Hynes, supra note 27, at 2. 
 90. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION 3-1.2 (1993) 
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE], available at http://www.ameri 
canbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_pfunc_tocold.html. 
Interestingly, while prosecutors were slow to accept a broader role in the criminal justice system, 
the ethical rules they were required to follow had long suggested that prosecutors should not be 
mindless case-processors in the courtroom. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1983), available at http://www.lawcornell.edu/ethics/aba/mcpr/MC 
PR.HTM (“The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his 
duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”). 
 91. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 90. The National District 
Attorneys Association articulated a similar view in their National Prosecution Standards, 
approved in 1991: 
The prosecutor has a client not shared with other members of the bar, i.e., society as a 
whole. . . . The prosecutor must seek justice. In doing so there is a need to balance the 
interests of all members of society, but when the balance cannot be struck in an individual 
case, the interest of society is paramount for the prosecutor. 
NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS’ ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 1.1, 1.3 (3d ed. 1991), 
available at http://www.ndaa.org/publications.html. As administrators of justice, prosecutors 
sought to represent the interests of society as a whole—even the interests of those who violated 
the laws they were responsible for enforcing. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power 
and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 52 (1998). 
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After a slow evolution spurred in part by the broken windows theory, 
prosecutors realized that the duty to seek justice is not limited to the 
courtroom, but applies to the administration of justice throughout the criminal 
justice system as a whole.92 
In Portland, Oregon, Multnomah County District Attorney Michael D. 
Schrunk became a prosecutor with a common goal in mind—to put bad guys 
behind bars and ensure “justice” for all—but over time he realized that his 
constituents had other ideas.93 As a rookie prosecutor in 1981, Schrunk 
thought: “If I [take] care of murders, rapes, and robberies, [I’ll] be a hero.”94 
But in a few short months, he realized that the community cared more about 
the “small things [such as] speeding, someone urinating in a doorway, [and] a 
one rock [cocaine] sale on a corner.”95 Portland had a community policing 
initiative, but Schrunk believed that community policing ultimately would not 
fix the minor quality-of-life issues without the support of the prosecutor’s 
office.96 Only a prosecutor could provide “on-going legal strategic advice to 
bring together both practical and legal solutions to these street behavior 
problems.”97 
After some lobbying from the community, Schrunk started one of the 
nation’s first community prosecution programs in 1990.98 Schrunk began the 
initiative in Lloyd District, a commercial area with plans to become a major 
commercial center, but the District also had a “seedy” reputation for public 
drinking, prostitution, vandalism, public urination, littering, and car break-
ins.99 These minor problems threatened to derail future development in an area 
that desperately needed rejuvenation.100 Community members had experienced 
enough; they were so eager to engage the prosecutor’s office in combating 
these low-level offenses that a local business association paid the salary of the 
neighborhood prosecutor assigned there.101 
 
 92. Davis, supra note 91, at 51. 
 93. ROBERT V. WOLF & JOHN L. WORRALL, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., 
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD: TEN COMMUNITY PROSECUTION LEADERSHIP PROFILES 53 (2004). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. (referring to the police and community as a two-legged tool that was ineffective 
without the third “leg” that only a prosecutor could bring). 
 97. Id. (quoting Wayne Pearson, Multnomah County’s first neighborhood District Attorney). 
 98. Id. Most community prosecution adherents credit Multnomah County for beginning the 
contemporary community prosecution movement. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at xi. 
However, Cook County State’s Attorney Bernhard Carey’s 1973 program in Chicago predates the 
modern community prosecution movement and even the community policing movement. JOHN S. 
GOLDKAMP ET AL., COMMUNITY PROSECUTION STRATEGIES 9 (2003), available at www.ncjrs. 
gov/txtfiles1/bja/195062.txt. 
 99. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at 53. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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In order to achieve the restoration of Lloyd District, the neighborhood 
prosecutor had to think creatively about how the tools of a prosecutor’s office 
could be used to address the problem.102 First, the community prosecutor 
identified the problem: a large number of transients illegally camped in the 
area and routinely committed petty crimes.103 Then, he brainstormed “out of 
the box,” non-traditional solutions.104 Since simply arresting and incarcerating 
the transient homeless people was unfeasible and unjust, the prosecutor pulled 
together volunteers to clean up the area.105 The city had used that tool for years 
(costing $40,000 every year), but over time the campers always returned.106 
This time, however, the community prosecutor concocted a plan to re-enforce 
this traditional tactic with informal control mechanisms of the community 
itself.107 The prosecutor posted brightly colored “No Camping” signs that 
included information about local shelters and asked members of the 
community to alert the police when they saw transients camping.108 After 
realizing that it was legal to do so, eventually citizens began to ask campers to 
leave on their own.109 Over time, the initiative helped stop the illegal camping 
and petty crime in the area.110 Unlike in the past, the transients relocated to 
shelters, instead of moving to a nearby neighborhood and waiting to return 
after the yearly cleanup.111 For the first time, the area was orderly, citizens 
were safer, and the city never had to spend money on cleanup again.112 The 
community prosecutor engaged with the community to fix the unfixable 
problem. 
As an innovator in community prosecution, Schrunk realized that 
community prosecution “means getting in the community and trying to solve 
problems at the lowest possible level and when appropriate, making lightning 
strike.”113 The community wants prosecutors to think about more than putting 
the “bad guys” away. They want “long-term, systemic infrastructure solutions 
to problems that are causes of, or breeding grounds for, criminal conduct.”114 
In the case of Lloyd District, addressing the cause of crime included a strategy 
to fix the problem of illegal camping, instead of relying on yearly clean-ups 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 53–54. 
 105. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at 54. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id.; see supra text accompanying notes 57–60. 
 108. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at 54. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. Id. at 54. 
 114. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at 54. 
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that failed to address the long-term social problem.115 In the case of a gang 
feud that had overtaken a violent Portland neighborhood, the solution included 
an innovative eviction and trespass enforcement plan to disrupt known gang 
areas.116 In the case of a county-wide problem of drug houses, the solution 
included working with state and federal law enforcement, local politicians, and 
community organizations to create “drug-free zones” where repeat drug 
offenders could be arrested by simply entering a drug-prone area.117 Each of 
these strategies involved creative, long-term solutions to systemic problems, 
and each of them illustrated a new fundamental conception of the role of the 
prosecutor as an administrator of justice.118 
V.  COMMUNITY PROSECUTION TODAY 
Over the last fifteen years, prosecutors have increasingly implemented 
community prosecution strategies.119 As recently as 1995, less than ten 
jurisdictions throughout the country engaged in community prosecution.120 By 
2005, two-thirds of all prosecutors practiced some elements of community 
prosecution.121 However, despite this widespread acceptance of the concept, 
prosecution strategies vary widely depending on the community, its problems, 
available resources, and the capacity of specific prosecutor’s offices.122 While 
prosecutors have not uniformly adopted each tactic or strategy associated with 
community prosecution, the vast majority have implemented the core strategies 
in some form.123 
Rather than a rigid program, community prosecution is a philosophy, a 
rejection of the idea that a prosecutor can only be successful when using the 
 
 115. Id. at 53–54. 
 116. JAMES F. HAYDEN, AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., COMMUNITY PROSECUTION 
TECHNIQUES TO REDUCE DRUG-RELATED GANG ACTIVITY1–2 (2007). 
 117. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at 55–56. The program worked in the following way: 
If someone is arrested for a drug offense within the zone, the arresting officer can issue a 
90-day notice of exclusion from the zone. If the person enters the zone within 90 days, he 
or she can be arrested for criminal trespass. If they are subsequently convicted of a drug 
offense, the exclusion is extended for an additional year. This eliminates the cumbersome 
and time-consuming process of obtaining a contempt warrant for every violation. 
Id. at 56. Obviously, the program could be abused, so the prosecutors worked with the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to make the program “very due-process oriented,” giving offenders 
the chance to appeal the exclusion and get variances if they live, work, or receive drug treatment 
within the designated zone. Id. at 55. 
 118. See HAYDEN, supra note 116, at 1–2; WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at 55–56. 
 119. See PERRY, supra note 11, at 9. 
 120. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at xi. 
 121. PERRY, supra note 11, at 9. 
 122. ROBERT V. WOLF, NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, COMMUNITY PROSECUTION AND 
SERIOUS CRIME: A GUIDE FOR PROSECUTORS 5 (2010). 
 123. PERRY, supra note 11, at 9. 
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case-processing model of prosecution.124 Community prosecutors do not 
abandon the traditional case-processing tools for crime reduction: 
investigation, prosecution, and conviction.125 Rather, the community 
prosecutor complements those tools with new tactics and new approaches: 
diversion, collaboration, community participation, and research-based 
innovation.126 He employs these new tactics in creative, open-minded, and 
flexible ways to address the problems of the community.127 In doing so, he 
does not confine himself to simply engaging in new tactics because any new 
tactic “might be seen as expendable when resources grow scarce or an upsurge 
in crime occurs.”128 Instead, the community prosecutor alters his office’s 
mission and changes the measures for assessing achievement.129 He places a 
greater premium on the use of discretion,130 de-emphasizes traditional 
organizational boundaries,131 and relies on a more transparent, accessible, and 
decentralized approach to prosecution.132 By thinking creatively about 
solutions to ongoing problems and partnering with actors within and outside 
the criminal justice system, community prosecutors re-shape their roles to 
become more effective.133 
A. Prosecutors as Problems Solvers 
First and foremost, community prosecutors serve as community problem 
solvers who use tools and strategies outside the traditional prosecutorial model 
to prevent and reduce crime, but also to strengthen vulnerable elements of the 
 
 124. Catherine M. Coles, Evolving Strategies in 20th-Century American Prosecution, in THE 
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 177, 199 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine 
Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) [hereinafter Evolving Strategies] (noting that prosecutors realized 
that “the capacity and tools of a felony case processing strategy could not meet late-20th-century 
challenges”). 
 125. Hynes, supra note 27, at 41. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Doolan, supra note 35, at 560. 
 128. Evolving Strategies, supra note 124, at 197. 
 129. Id. at 199. 
 130. Id. Under community prosecution’s proactive, problem-solving approach, prosecutors 
necessarily have more freedom to use strategies and tactics tailored to their specific community 
problems. GOLDKAMP, supra note 12, at xiii. 
 131. Evolving Strategies, supra note 124, at 199. Community prosecutors work with other 
criminal justice and community partners in new fundamental ways that represent a shift from the 
traditional case-processing model. GOLDKAMP, supra note 12, at xiii. 
 132. Thompson, supra note 8, at 355; Evolving Strategies, supra note 124, at 199. 
Community prosecutors work closely with citizens and increase cross-boundary collaboration by 
giving the community and other criminal justice officials a stake in the prosecution function. 
GOLDKAMP, supra note 12, at 6–7 (noting that community prosecutors “invite[]” the community 
and other partners to participate in developing the prosecutor’s strategy). 
 133. Hynes, supra note 27, at 1. 
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community.134 In 2009, in his remarks at the American Bar Association annual 
meeting in Chicago, Attorney General Eric Holder, still clearly committed to 
the innovative solutions he implemented as United States Attorney for the 
District of Columbia,135 declared: “[G]etting smart on crime means thinking 
about crime in context—not just reacting to the criminal act, but developing 
the government’s ability to enhance public safety before the crime is 
committed and after the former offender is returned to society.”136 Getting 
“smart” through innovative and collaborative problem solving drives 
community prosecution today and represents the one overarching theme that 
links each strategy, tactic, and tool of the movement.137 
A community prosecutor takes the form of a proactive and innovative 
problem solver who thinks “outside the box,” rather than a reactive and 
traditional case processor who confines to the prosecutorial role.138 As 
community problem solvers, community prosecutors use civil sanctions, 
landlord-tenant laws, health and safety-code enforcement, and various other 
non-traditional tactics.139 They hire non-lawyers who can assist with matters of 
public health, substance-abuse treatment, social services, public relations, 
community organizing, marketing, journalism, and crime prevention.140 
 
 134. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 81; WOLF, supra note 
122, at 5; GOLDKAMP, supra note 12, at 6–7; Evolving Strategies, supra note 124, at 195–96. 
 135. Recognizing the broader conception of justice, current Attorney General Eric Holder, as 
United States Attorney at the time, broke new ground by starting a community prosecution 
program in the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia as a way to re-build 
trust with (and within) the community. Hynes, supra note 27, at 41. Holder premised the program 
on a very simple idea: re-build trust and community networks to embolden citizens to play a role 
in preventing crime and restoring their neighborhoods. See id. Holder realized that his office 
could more effectively address the crime problem by deploying his prosecutors into the 
community where they could develop relationships with police officers, businesses, non-profit 
organizations, educational institutions, the faith community, and citizens generally. Michael D. 
Schrunk, Federal–Local Partnerships: A Win for the Community, U.S. ATT’Y’S BULL., May–June 
2000, at 31. 
 136. Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Address to the 2009 ABA Convention (Aug. 3, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090803.html. 
 137. Professor Catherine Coles describes community prosecution through three broad 
categories: case-processing, developing partnerships, and problem-solving to prevent and reduce 
crime. Evolving Strategies, supra note 124, at 195. However, under the problem-solving category, 
she discusses how community prosecutors use “targeted and expedited criminal prosecutions” 
(i.e., the traditional case-processing tactic) and cooperation with citizens and other agencies (i.e., 
developing partnerships), thereby suggesting that the focus on an innovative problem-solving 
approach drives the community prosecution philosophy. Id. at 195–96; see also GOLDKAMP, 
supra note 12, at 9. 
 138. Doolan, supra note 35, at 560. 
 139. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at xi. 
 140. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 76 (describing how former 
prosecutor and current United States Senator Claire McCaskill routinely hired outsiders because 
they help prosecutors think “outside the box”). 
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Community prosecutors routinely coordinate with non-prosecutorial groups, 
such as property owners, community organizations, and non-crime related 
government agencies,141 but also place more emphasis on initiating 
collaboration with other criminal justice agencies, instead of confining their 
focus to the courtroom.142 They obtain funding for and administer programs 
that fall outside the traditional “crime” focus by addressing other social 
problems such as poverty, homelessness, and unemployment.143 Quite literally, 
community prosecutors think “outside the box” by using every available tool 
and engaging with every available partner to solve problems in their 
communities. 
B. Community Prosecution Strategies, Tactics, and Tools 
Emboldened with a new understanding of the prosecutorial function, 
community prosecutors offer innovative solutions to community concerns that 
they could not offer under the case-processing prosecutorial model.144 
Community prosecutors must be imaginative and unafraid to challenge the 
traditional model. They look beyond their individual cases to develop 
strategies to end the repetitive cycle of crime.145 They focus on reshaping the 
community over the long-term by engaging in innovative strategies such as 
youth education, alternative justice programs for juveniles, and domestic 
violence prevention initiatives.146 They work to rebuild the most depressed 
areas of the community by targeting known criminal havens through civil 
sanctions and city ordinances.147 They focus on breaking down the barriers 
between citizens and criminal justice officials through community 
engagement.148 With the freedom to act as innovative problem solvers instead 
of traditional case-processors, community prosecutors implement unique 
prevention, enforcement, and treatment methods to attack the heart of the 
problems in their communities. 
 
 141. Doolan, supra note 35, at 561. 
 142. Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 76–77. 
 143. Id. at 76. 
 144. CHANGING NATURE OF PROSECUTION, supra note 9, at 32 (arguing that community 
prosecutors are more likely than traditional prosecutors to identify and implement solutions to 
problems that “involve the use of non-traditional problem-solving strategies and varied 
prevention, enforcement, and treatment methods”). 
 145. Id. at 32 (finding that community prosecutors aim to “address[] the conditions that 
allow . . . serious crime to flourish.”); Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, 
at 73 (arguing that community prosecutors hope to end the “endless routine” of imprisoning the 
same criminals after they commit the same or similar crimes over and over again). 
 146. Doolan, supra note 35, at 562; Gramckow, supra note 35, at 17 (finding that community 
prosecutors “engage in drug education in schools [and] coordinate projects to develop alternative 
activities for juveniles”); Prevention Through Community Prosecution, supra note 4, at 78. 
 147. Gramckow, supra note 35, at 17. 
 148. Evolving Strategies, supra note 124, at 195. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] FIXING THE UNFIXABLE 175 
Since community prosecution represents a change in a prosecutor’s 
philosophy and mission rather than a strict adherence to specific tactics or 
programs, the experience of a community prosecutor varies depending on the 
conditions and problems in his or her community.149 Thus, ten different 
community prosecutors in ten different communities may come up with ten 
different strategies to address a similar crime problem. Despite this variability, 
successful community prosecution strategies across the country share some 
underlying dimensions and provide an organizing framework.150 The ground-
breaking leaders of the community prosecution movement can serve as a 
model for success in crime prevention, intervention, and targeted law 
enforcement methods.151 
VI.  APPLYING COMMUNITY PROSECUTION IN EAST ST. LOUIS 
A. East St. Louis: An Abandoned City 
Located on the southwestern edge of Illinois and in the St. Louis 
metropolitan area, East St. Louis embodies the traditional industrial suburb that 
can be found in manufacturing areas throughout the United States, particularly 
the American Midwest.152 The city shows “the scars of a long existence . . . 
and signs of a previous life.”153 An observer driving through the community 
cannot escape the evident depression and widespread poverty.154 Professor 
Andrew Theising described East St. Louis in the following way: 
[The city’s] commercial district shows wide streets that are mostly quiet. 
Office buildings obviously have been vacant for years. For every window with 
glass, there appears to be one with boards. Iron bars protect what little is left. 
Many residential sections of town showcase dilapidated housing. The roofs 
sag, the chimneys lean, weeds overtake yards and driveways. Occasionally 
there is a house in good repair, but many show neglect. Every street has a 
burned-out shell or vacant lot, and graffiti is painted across prominent facades. 
Looming on the horizon is the silhouette of an abandoned factory building that 
rattles as the wind blows through it. It has become a haven for pigeons and 
mischievous youth. . . . The only hustle and bustle the city knows today are the 
 
 149. GOLDKAMP, supra note 12, at xiii (finding that community prosecution does not fit into 
a “one-size-fits-all” model). 
 150. Id. at xiii, xv. 
 151. WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at xi (recognizing the following ten national 
community prosecution leaders: The City of Dallas, TX; The City and County of Denver, CO; 
Fulton County (Atlanta), GA; Hennepin County (Minneapolis), MN; Kalamazoo County 
(Kalamazoo), MI; Kings County (Brooklyn), NY; Marion County (Indianapolis), IN; Multnomah 
County (Portland), OR; Travis County (Austin), TX; and Washington D.C.). 
 152. THEISING, supra note 14, at 7. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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interstates which carry a different population on raised roadways around the 
city on the way to somewhere else.155 
To the outside observer, East St. Louis epitomizes a distressed, abandoned 
place left behind by the “widespread, systematic disinvestment in the nation’s 
basic productive capacity.”156 As working class men and women across the 
country struggle to survive in a post-manufacturing age, nowhere is that 
struggle more evident than in East St. Louis, where life “is mired in issues of 
safety, damaged infrastructure, and poor prospects for the future.”157 
Before East St. Louis became nationally known as an abandoned industrial 
suburb, many considered the city the “Pittsburgh of the West” with the nation’s 
second largest rail center in close proximity to the abundant coalmines of 
Southern Illinois.158 In the mid-nineteenth century, the city thrived as a 
commercial and industrial center with a “seemingly endless source of 
employment and commerce.”159 East St. Louis attracted immense numbers of 
racial minorities and ethnic immigrants because rapid industrial growth offered 
opportunity to the poor and the working class.160 A 1921 state report rated the 
city’s schools as the best in Illinois.161 
Despite its early success, East St. Louis has experienced a long, slow 
period of abandonment.162 Over time, extraordinary racial segregation and a 
national reputation for corruption, illegal gambling, prostitution, and organized 
crime halted the development of a middle class.163 In the early twentieth 
century, East St. Louis became “the second poorest city of its size in the 
nation.”164 A national economic shift and changes in population growth after 
World War II only made the city’s problems worse.165 Industry abandoned the 
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 163. Id. at 12. 
 164. HAMER, supra note 16, at 44. 
 165. THEISING, supra note 14, at 12–13. Although the post-World War II economic and 
population shifts would soon cripple the city, Look Magazine and the National Municipal League 
(now called the National Civic League) designated East St. Louis an “All American city” in 1960. 
Nicholas J.C. Pistor, East St. Louis Weighs Rematch, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 3, 2011, at 
D2; see also Past Winners of the All-America City Award, NAT’L CIVIC LEAGUE, http://www.alla 
mericacityaward.com/things-to-know-about-all-america-city-award/past-winners-of-the-all-
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city, which led to unprecedented unemployment.166 Jobs, money, and people 
left soon after,167 leaving East St. Louis to flounder ever since.168 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development’s description of East 
St. Louis as the “most distressed small city in America” in 1989 showcased the 
city as a sad example of abandonment.169 Yet, the city has only continued its 
slow, agonizing decline over the last twenty years.170 East St. Louis has lost an 
average of 15 percent of its population in every census since 1950.171 The 
city’s current population of 27,006, considered a very generous estimate by 
many observers,172 is roughly one-third of its peak of 82,295 in 1950.173 Once 
known as a thriving industrial suburb home to notable residents such as jazz 
musician Miles Davis, Olympic athlete Jackie Joyner-Kersee, and rock-and-
roll icon Chuck Berry, East St. Louis is now known as the city with one of the 
 
america-city-award/past-winners-of-the-all-america-city-award-1940s-and-1950s/ (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2013). Recognizing the decline of the city in a 1999 visit, President Bill Clinton said, 
“The Government . . . [and] private enterprise will make East St. Louis that all-American city 
again, if we go forward together.” Presidential Remarks to the Community in East St. Louis, 
Illinois, 35 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1289, 1292 (July 6, 1999), available at http://clinton4. 
nara.gov/WH/New/html/19990706c.html. 
 166. THEISING, supra note 14, at 12–13. During the period from 1960 through 1987, East St. 
Louis lost more than thirteen thousand jobs. Mary Edwards & Laura Lawson, The Evolution of 
Planning in East St. Louis, 4 J. PLAN. HIST. 356, 368–69 (2005). Given the extraordinary industry 
and population losses, the city’s assessed valuation fell by 78 percent between 1960 and 1990, 
which caused an extreme drop in municipal revenues that led to serious reductions or the 
elimination of basic services. Id. 
 167. THEISING, supra note 14, at 13. By 1970, almost half of the manufacturing jobs based in 
East St. Louis at its manufacturing peak had disappeared. HAMER, supra note 16, at 46. 
 168. THEISING, supra note 14, at 13. 
 169. Id. at 11, 13. 
 170. Id. While the Department of Housing and Urban Development provided national 
recognition of the city’s problems in 1989, East St. Louis has since become engrained in our 
culture as the epitome of extreme poverty and overall despair. In a 1999 article by the satirical 
magazine, The Onion, East St. Louis was jokingly referred to as a “top American city” by 
“Poverty Magazine.” East St. Louis Rated Number-One City in America by ‘Poverty Magazine’, 
ONION, Oct. 27, 1999, http://www.theonion.com/articles/east-st-louis-rated-numberone-city-in-
america-by-p,3961/. In the wake of Barack Obama’s election as the nation’s first African-
American President, award-winning journalist Tom Brokaw offered a more sober commentary of 
the well-known struggles of East St. Louis in a 2010 primetime documentary special on USA 
Network. American Character Along Highway 50 (USA Network television broadcast Jan. 18, 
2010), available at http://www.usanetwork.com/highway50/videos/. Brokaw described a city that 
has struggled to keep pace in the twenty-first century, but still shows signs of life and vibrancy. 
Id. 
 171. THEISING, supra note 14, at 13. 
 172. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, State & County QuickFacts: East Saint Louis (city), U.S. 
CENSUS 2010, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1722255.html (last visited Jan. 10, 
2013), ; Doug Moore, Some Jump for Joy over Census Data, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 23, 
2010, at A5. 
 173. THEISING, supra note 14, at 13. 
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“highest unemployment, poverty, and high school dropout rates” in the 
country.174 
Although the city has less than thirty thousand residents, East St. Louis has 
become one of the largest concentrations of poor in the country.175 
Approximately half of East St. Louis residents and 56 percent of youth live 
below the poverty line.176 “[A]mong those sixteen years old and older, almost 
50 percent do not participate in the labor force, and of the 50 percent actively 
participating, about 10 percent are officially unemployed.”177 Moreover, 
“[n]early half of residents age eighteen and older have not completed high 
school.”178 Approximately 70 percent of children are born to single mothers 
and 25 percent to adolescent girls.179 Fifty-six percent of East St. Louis 
families have annual incomes of less than $25,000 compared with 13.5 percent 
of families nationwide, and, significantly, more than half of the population 
depends on some form of government assistance.180 The East St. Louis of 2012 
is a poverty-stricken, abandoned industrial city with staggering problems.181 
B. Crime in East St. Louis 
A recent Federal Bureau of Investigation report revealed that crime across 
the country sits at its lowest level in forty years, but in East St. Louis, the trend 
has gone in the opposite direction.182 Nationally, “[t]he odds of being murdered 
 
 174. Id. at 199; HAMER, supra note 16, at 30. While Professor Theising recognizes the 
general decline of East St. Louis, his analysis of the city’s history paints East St. Louis as a clear 
descendant of a broken city from a century ago. THEISING, supra note 14, at 5, 13. Theising 
draws a compelling picture of the dichotomy of East St. Louis: a city built on corruption, vice, 
and disorganization that was quite successful at various stages of its history and produced some 
famous residents with fond memories of their experiences. Id. at 200. Theising cogently 
summarizes the dichotomy through the words of former resident, Thomas Petraitis: “Generations 
from now, historian[s] will look at East St. Louis and wonder how anyone could ever have lived 
in such a horrible place. How, then, do you explain the fact that ex-residents, black and white, 
truly loved this city?” Id. (quoting THOMAS E. PETRAITIS, GROWING UP LITHUANIAN IN EAST 
ST. LOUIS, ILLINOIS: MEMORIES OF THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION LITHUANIAN PARISH AND 
GRADE SCHOOL 14 (1995)). 
 175. HAMER, supra note 16, at 52; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 172. 
 176. HAMER, supra note 16, at 31; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 172. 
 177. HAMER, supra note 16, at 31. 
 178. Id. at 52. 
 179. Id. at 161. 
 180. Id. at 52. 
 181. THEISING, supra note 14, at 13. 
 182. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
STATES 2010, at 1 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/2010%20CIUS%20Summary.pdf; Richard Florida, Don’t Fear 
the City: Urban America’s Crime Drops to Lowest in 40 Years, ATLANTIC (May 24, 2011, 10:42 
AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/05/dont-fear-the-city-urban-americas-
crime-drops-to-lowest-in-40-years/239366/; Douglas A. McIntyre et al., The 10 Most Dangerous 
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or robbed are now less than half of what they were in the early 1990s, when 
violent crime peaked in the United States.”183 For instance, in New York City, 
2,245 people were murdered in 1990, but less than 600 people have been 
murdered for the past nine years in a row.184 The national drop has been so 
dramatic that some experts are pondering, “[h]ow low could [the drop in 
violent crime] go?”185 But if one of these experts asked a resident of East St. 
Louis that question, he would likely receive a blank stare in amazement or 
outburst of laughter. While crime has dropped nationally, East St. Louis has 
become a “no man’s land” where murder and violent crime are the norm.186 
East St. Louis is the most violent city in America with a murder rate nearly 
twenty times higher than the national average, and contrary to national trends, 
violent crime rates continue on an upward trajectory.187 
Compared to other American cities and even some of the most dangerous 
places in the world, East St. Louis faces staggering rates of crime. While the 
national average for annual homicides is approximately 5.5 per one hundred 
thousand people, East St. Louis has a homicide rate of around 93 per one 
hundred thousand.188 The homicide rates of other cities that routinely make the 
list of “most dangerous cities” in the country pale in comparison to East St. 
Louis’ rate of 93: Washington, D.C. (35), Newark (40), St. Louis (40), Detroit 
(41), and New Orleans (42).189 The city’s homicide rate (93) stands at a level 
significantly higher than the rates of notable developing nations that are 
 
Cities in America, ATLANTIC (May 26, 2011, 12:14 PM), www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/ 
2011/05/the-10-most-dangerous-cities-in-america/239513/. 
 183. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Steady Decline in Major Crime Baffles Experts, N.Y. TIMES, May 
24, 2011, at A17. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (quoting Michael Jacobson, director of the Vera Institute of Justice and a former New 
York City correction and probation officer). 
 186. Kevin Killeen, Federal and State Prosecutors Warn of “No Man’s Land” of Violent 
Crime in East St. Louis, CBS ST. LOUIS (January 19, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/ 
2012/01/19/federal-and-state-prosecutors-warn-of-no-mans-land-of-violent-crime-in-east-st-
louis-area/ (quoting Stephen Wigginton, United States Attorney for the Southern District of 
Illinois). 
 187. Id.; DENNIS MARES, PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENT 
CRIME IN EAST ST. LOUIS 23 (2011) [hereinafter VIOLENT CRIME]. 
 188. SPATIAL HOMICIDE PATTERNS, supra note 17, at 4. 
 189. VIOLENT CRIME, supra note 187 at 2; DENNIS MARES, PROJECT SAFE 
NEIGHBORHOODS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: VIOLENT CRIME IN EAST 
ST. LOUIS 2 (2011) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS].  Numerous newspapers and 
magazines publish annual lists of America’s “most dangerous cities” based on Federal Bureau of 
Investigation crime and population statistics, and they often vary depending on the formula used. 
See, e.g., John Giuffo, America’s Most Dangerous Cities, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2012, 6:58 PM), www. 
forbes.com/sites/johngiuffo/2011/10/03/americas-most-dangerous-cities/; McIntyre et al., supra 
note 182; Danielle Kurtzleben, The 11 Most Dangerous Cities, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 
(Feb. 16, 2011), www.usnews.com/news/articles/2011/02/16/the-11-most-dangerous-cities. 
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infamous for their violent crime, including El Salvador (70), Jamaica (60), 
Colombia (35), and Haiti (21).190 Based on the yearly homicide rate alone, East 
St. Louis is one of the most dangerous cities in the world, not just the United 
States.191 
The small population of East St. Louis relative to other cities could make a 
comparison of crime rates misleading; however, the annual number of 
homicides in East St. Louis relative to other cities, irrespective of crime rates, 
paints a similarly bleak picture. According to a recent list of the “most 
dangerous cities” in America compiled by The Atlantic, Rockford, Illinois, 
Little Rock, Arkansas, and New Haven, Connecticut, were listed as the ninth, 
seventh, and fourth most dangerous cities, respectively.192  In 2010, Rockford 
reported twenty homicides, Little Rock reported twenty-five, and New Haven 
reported twenty-two.193 In the same year, East St. Louis had twenty-five 
homicides,194 which equals Little Rock and exceeds Rockford and New Haven. 
These numbers are even more astounding when one considers the relative 
populations of each city. East St. Louis, a city of less than 30,000 people, 
equaled or exceeded the number of murders in Rockford (156,180 people), 
Little Rock (192,922 people), and New Haven (124,856 people).195 In 2007, 
when East St. Louis had thirty murders, nearby Alton, Illinois, a city of similar 
size, reported four homicides.196 By any measure, East St. Louis sits in a 
league of its own when it comes to homicide and violent crime. 
While the homicide rate of the entire city of East St. Louis paints a picture 
of staggering crime, the rates within the most violent areas of the city suggest a 
serious crime epidemic. Generally, homicides tend to be concentrated in the 
most economically disadvantaged communities, and since many East St. Louis 
residents can be classified as poor, one may expect homicide to be high 
without further concentrations.197 However, homicides within East St. Louis 
exhibit a clear spatial pattern, concentrated around certain public housing 
 
 190. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 189, at 5. Comparing the annual rate of homicides 
in a city to the rate of homicides in a country has obvious flaws. In any given country, some cities 
have much higher crime rates than the country-wide average, while other cities have much lower 
rates. However, despite these potential flaws, the comparison nonetheless paints a staggering 
picture of the sheer depth of the crime problem in East St. Louis. 
 191. See id. 
 192. McIntyre et al., supra note 182. 
 193. Id. 
 194. SPATIAL HOMICIDE PATTERNS, supra note 17, at 2. The yearly number of murders in 
East St. Louis inevitably fluctuates from year to year. Based on Professor Mares’s calculations 
from 2000 to 2010, the annual average number of homicides is twenty-four. Id. 
 195. McIntyre et al., supra note 182. 
 196. Marlon Walker, Layoffs Burden City’s Police, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 
2011, at B1. 
 197. SPATIAL HOMICIDE PATTERNS, supra note 17, at 3. 
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projects.198 The most significant concentration of homicides from 2000 to 2010 
occurred in the two-block radius around the DeShields/Robinson housing 
areas.199 Twenty-two homicides occurred, equating to 2.2 homicides per year 
and a murder rate of 270 homicides per one hundred thousand people.200 From 
2006 to 2010, seventeen homicides occurred, equating to a murder rate of 418 
per one hundred thousand people.201 Astonishingly, this area of East St. Louis 
has a higher murder rate than Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, the center of Mexico’s 
drug cartel violence and the country’s “bloodiest city,” which had a murder 
rate of 229 per one hundred thousand people in 2010.202 While the 
DeShields/Robinson housing area has the highest concentration of homicides, 
other areas in the city, primarily around other public housing projects, exhibit 
annual murder rates near or greater than 100 per one hundred thousand 
people.203 Although most cities contain areas with high incidences of 
homicide, the rates in these areas of East St. Louis likely exceed, by significant 
margins in some cases, those of more familiar violent areas of Chicago, 
Detroit, Newark, and New Orleans.204 
Although the murder rate in East St. Louis provides a stark example of the 
city’s most serious crime, incidences of robbery, rape, assault, drug crime, and 
property crime suggest a systemic crime problem. The overall crime rate (both 
property crime and violent crime) in East St. Louis sits at 160 per one thousand 
residents, compared to 95 in St. Louis, 65 in Kansas City, and 50 in 
Chicago.205 The United States claims a robbery rate of 133 per one hundred 
thousand people, but in East St. Louis, the rate stands at 921 and 1,136 around 
three prominent public housing projects.206 The nation claims a rape incidence 
rate of 29, but in East St. Louis, the rate stands at 150 and 363 around these 
housing projects.207 Most staggeringly, while the country as a whole has an 
assault rate of 262, the rate in East St. Louis stands at 4,685 and 13,090 around 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 4. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See id. at 3–4; Randal C. Archibald, Mexico’s Drug War Bloodies Areas Thought Safe, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, at A1. Admittedly, Ciudad Juarez likely has higher concentrations of 
homicide in its worst areas, but the general comparison to the city is eye-opening nonetheless. 
When any area of the United States has a substantially higher murder rate than the murder capital 
of Mexico (and one of the most dangerous cities on the globe), the area can be considered a “no 
man’s land.” Killeen, supra note 186 (quoting Stephen Wigginton, U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of Illinois). 
 203. SPATIAL HOMICIDE PATTERNS, supra note 17, at 3. 
 204. Id. at 2. 
 205. Id. at 4. 
 206. Id. at 7, 16. 
 207. Id. at 17. 
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the same housing projects.208 Undoubtedly, East St. Louis has a serious crime 
problem across all categories, but the stable concentration of crime around a 
few public housing projects indicates a pervasive and structural crime 
epidemic.209 
VII.  COMMUNITY PROSECUTION: FIXING THE CRIME EPIDEMIC IN EAST ST. 
LOUIS 
East St. Louis has a long history of failed leadership and failed policies 
that have done little to fix the city’s problems.210 Faced with a series of public 
humiliations caused by long-time mayor Carl Officer and an infamous record 
of corruption and mismanagement that left the city bankrupt, the State of 
Illinois took unprecedented action to fix the “East St. Louis problem” in 
1989.211 Governor James Thompson announced that the state would withhold 
all financial assistance unless the city dramatically changed leadership.212 
Thompson even appointed a state panel to manage the city’s finances under the 
authority of the Illinois Financially Distressed City Act.213 Thompson gave the 
panel the power to approve or reject the city’s budgets, financial plans, new 
projects, and major purchases.214 If the city did not comply with the panel’s 
requirements, the State would force the city to give up its spending 
authority.215 While it had a generally positive effect at first, the panel has not 
had the desired effect of “fixing” East St. Louis—as is evident from the fact 
that the state controlling entity remains in existence more than twenty years 
after its creation.216 
 
 208. Id. at 18. 
 209. SPATIAL HOMICIDE PATTERNS, supra note 17, at 10. 
 210. See generally THEISING, supra note 14, at 19–32. 
 211. Id. at 32. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. Referred to as the “East St. Louis Bailout,” both the Illinois House of Representatives 
and Senate passed Governor Thompson’s oversight bill by overwhelming margins after long, 
lively debates that focused entirely on East St. Louis. Id. at 32–38. 
 214. HAMER, supra note 16, at 51. 
 215. Id. 
 216. THEISING, supra note 14, at 38. Under the headline “East St. Louis: A City That Doesn’t 
Work” from an editorial in 2003, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch encapsulated the unusual, and very 
sad, state of affairs in East St. Louis: “Imagine living in a city where nearly every municipal 
function is controlled by outsiders[.]” Editorial, East St. Louis: A City That Doesn’t Work, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 22, 2003, at 30 [hereinafter Editorial]. In this article, the St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch Editorial Board declined to endorse a candidate prior to the city’s 2003 mayoral 
primary because the board “thought it best to discuss the exceptional challenges facing the city.” 
Id. The Editorial described the grim reality of life under the incompetent and corrupt local 
leadership of East St. Louis: 
[L]ocal leaders aren’t perceived as being competent enough to make government 
work . . . . Solving the city’s problems would require a Herculean effort that none of the 
candidates seems able to mount . . . . [T]he city is so dysfunctional that it has lost control 
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East St. Louis faces deeply embedded problems that will not be fixed 
easily.217 Professor Andrew Theising argues that East St. Louis faces an 
institutional problem that will replicate the same problems and failed policies 
of the past long into the future.218 The contemporary problems in the city do 
not stem from contemporary circumstances or demographics, but rather 
sustained factors over time.219 To fix this embedded problem, leaders must 
target the root cause, instead of the obvious symptoms.220 Theising argues that 
“[i]nstitutions are slow to change, at best,” thus, past programs that have 
targeted the symptoms, instead of the underlying institutions, have only made 
problems worse.221 To restore and rebuild East St. Louis, leaders must engage 
in radical solutions that “tear down one kind of government and rebuild 
another.”222 East St. Louis has extraordinary problems that will not be solved 
unless city, county, and state leaders adopt new, innovative approaches that 
challenge the failed assumptions of the past. 
A. “Something has to change in East St. Louis” 
Upon his appointment to the position of St. Clair County State’s Attorney 
in November 2010, Brendan Kelly realized that the traditional case-processing 
model of prosecution had failed to address the underlying systemic crime and 
social problems in East St. Louis.223 If prosecutors defined success through the 
traditional case-processing model of managing cases through disposition, St. 
Clair County prosecutors had been very successful for a long time.224 
However, Kelly recognized that prosecutors’ traditional case-processing efforts 
had done little to stem the horrific rate of violent crime in East St. Louis or 
 
of many of its entities, including schools, community development funds, higher 
education, housing, and, to some extent, riverfront development. In all these areas, 
oversight boards control part or all of what the city can and can’t do. The fact is, nobody 
trusts East St. Louis government[.] 
Id. Coincidentally, albeit unrelated, less than a month after the St. Louis Post-Dispatch published 
the editorial, U.S. forces began Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, which resulted in 
outsiders taking control of the Middle Eastern nation. See David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, Bush 
Orders Start of War in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, March 20, 2003, at A1. The outside forces remained in 
control of Iraq for nearly nine years until their departure in December 2011. Tim Arango & 
Michael S. Schmidt, Last Convoy of American Troops Leaves Iraq, Marking a War’s End, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at A6. In contrast, outsiders have retained control of almost every sector of 
East St. Louis for more than twenty-two years. Editorial, supra note 216, at 30. 
 217. THEISING, supra note 14, at 202. 
 218. Id. at 202 (“Where there are replicated results over time, institutions are at work.”). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 203. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 224. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
184 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII:157 
address the endemic poverty, homelessness, and joblessness in the city.225 
Thus, Kelly envisioned a new goal and emphasized a new mission where 
prosecutors could influence the entire criminal justice process.226 
Echoing the principles of the community prosecution movement, Kelly 
believes prosecutors have an obligation to consider the causes and 
circumstances of crime by questioning the conditions that give rise to criminal 
activity and identifying solutions that affect those particular conditions.227 
Kelly argues that “criminal justice and social justice are twins separated at 
birth,” and to be effective, prosecutors must take a broad approach to crime 
fighting and accept a new, more holistic understanding of the prosecutor’s role 
in ensuring community justice.228 Quite simply, Kelly believes that “something 
ha[s] to change in East St. Louis,” and as a prosecutor and a member of the 
community, he feels obligated to help facilitate that change.229 
B. Problem Solving Prosecution in East St. Louis 
To address the long-term systemic problems in East St. Louis adequately, 
St. Clair County prosecutors must expand beyond the traditional, reactive role 
of prosecution and engage in innovative problem solving.230 The Illinois statute 
that gives authority to the State’s Attorney (chief prosecutor) in each county 
defines the position as the “Chief Law Enforcement Officer” and a 
“community leader” with the goal of “increas[ing] public safety and 
enhanc[ing] the quality of life for [county] citizens.”231 To accomplish that 
goal, St. Clair County prosecutors must identify specific problems within East 
St. Louis, brainstorm possible solutions, and “facilitate and bring together all 
the different people necessary to solve those problems by implementing those 
possible solutions.”232 To affect this change, St. Clair County prosecutors 
believe they can use the influence of the State’s Attorney’s Office and their 
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. Kelly considers East St. Louis a “felony factory” where there is a clear link between a 
person’s violent environment at a young age and that person’s propensity to engage in violent 
crime in the future. He argues that prosecutors under the traditional case-processing model “don’t 
really care why and how” a person’s environment affects crime. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
However, by taking a “more holistic, community approach,” prosecutors can begin to understand 
that seemingly disparate elements are linked. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Interview with Jon Allard, Chief of the Admin. Div., St. Clair Cnty. State’s Attorney 
Office, in Belleville, Ill. (Jan. 13, 2012) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Allard 
Interview]. 
 231. Id.; 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-9005 (2011). 
 232. Allard Interview, supra note 230. 
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analytical legal training to address interconnected county, city, and 
neighborhood issues through innovative problem solving.233 
In the first phase of the problem-solving process, St. Clair County 
prosecutors went to great lengths to consider every available tool to fix the 
crime problem in their community.234 Prosecutors asked themselves: 
What else can we do to prevent crime [other than just deterrence]? . . . [I]n 
what ways can we engage the community . . . law enforcement, probation, 
social services, churches, and neighborhood organizations [to fix the 
problem]? . . . [H]ow can we use the tools that we already have, in terms of the 
law and in terms of statutes, better than what we’re already doing? . . . What 
have other cities and counties across the country done to address these 
problems?235 
Once St. Clair County prosecutors redefined their mission as broad-based 
actors for social change instead of mere criminal case managers, they realized 
that engaging in innovative problem solving was easy.236 Ideas flowed freely 
as soon as they reshaped the model by which they considered strategies to 
prosecute crime, ensure social justice, and create a better community.237 At the 
core of their new mission, St. Clair County prosecutors now understand that 
reliance on the traditional case-processing model will do very little to fix the 
fundamental problems in East St. Louis.238 
C. Current Community Prosecution Strategies in St. Clair County 
To accomplish their broad problem-solving mission, St. Clair County 
prosecutors have already developed innovative strategies to target the 
underlying circumstances and causes of crime. They recognize the importance 
 
 233. Id. Allard argues, first and foremost, that lawyers are problem solvers who are taught to 
look “outside the box.” Id. Thus, by taking the “macro level view” of crime, prosecutors can 
identify the linkages that exist amongst broad social problems and individualized crime. Id. In the 
end, Allard believes that “the greatest prosecution is the prosecution we never have to bring 
because we’ve prevented crime.” Id.; see also Ronald Goldstock, The Prosecutor as Problem-
Solver, CRIM. JUST. 8–9 (1992) (contending that prosecutors should take the lead in criminal 
justice policy through problem-solving methods because of their legal expertise, access to civil 
law enforcement tactics, and broad jurisdictional reach). 
 234. See Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 235. Id. Kelly believes that prosecutors must look beyond their communities to find solutions 
and use every available legal tool to fix the fundamental problems in the community. Id. He 
argues that prosecutors have been behind the curve in using the tools given to them by state 
legislatures. Id. Prosecutors can use innovative statutes dealing with nuisance abatement, 
environmental sanctions, asset forfeiture, etc. to their advantage, but historically they have not 
done so. Id. Kelly believes that these tools are “essential in re-shaping the model by which we can 
prosecute crime, ensure social justice, and create a better community.” Id. 
 236. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 237. See id. 
 238. See id. 
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of the traditional prosecutorial role of case-processing, deterring and 
incarcerating criminals, and obtaining justice for victims.239 However, they 
also realize that these traditional methods target the symptoms of crime rather 
than the cause and do very little to ensure bad actors will change their behavior 
in the future.240 Fundamentally, St. Clair County prosecutors believe they have 
an obligation to stop the “endless cycle” of crime241 and “challenge 
conventional wisdom to achieve results and affect real change.”242 Thus, they 
have started experimenting in different areas within St. Clair County with the 
ultimate goal of applying the lessons learned to East St. Louis.243 
By targeting specific crime-ridden neighborhoods, St. Clair County 
prosecutors have already made significant strides in increasing engagement 
and cooperation with community members.244 After a deadly gun battle raged 
through the Parkfield Terrace neighborhood of unincorporated St. Clair 
County,245 prosecutors developed “The Parkfield Project” to address the 
neighborhood’s historical and ongoing problem of violence.246 Early on, 
prosecutors focused on building goodwill in the neighborhood and developing 
relationships with citizens.247 They showed leniency on offenders of petty 
crimes and civil codes as long as they agreed to take action to change their 
behavior.248 Prosecutors brainstormed other “out of the box” strategies in an 
attempt to penetrate the neighborhood that had long been off-limits to law 
enforcement.249 
In an attempt to engage directly with residents, prosecutors went to great 
lengths to be more accessible and more approachable. They held a special 
court setting in Parkfield Terrace, so offenders would not have to go to “the big 
scary courthouse downtown.”250 At the court setting, prosecutors spoke at 
 
 239. Allard Interview, supra note 230. 
 240. See id. (noting that after prosecuting defendants for murder in a particular neighborhood, 
“[the area] would quiet down for awhile,” but over time “someone would rise up to take the place 
of the guy who was in prison.”). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 243. Allard Interview, supra note 230 (characterizing the experimentation as a series of “test 
strategies” to be applied in East St. Louis and in surrounding communities). 
 244. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 245. Jennifer Mann, Police decry violence that left teen dead in St. Clair County, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 3, 2011, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/illinois/police-decry-vio 
lence-that-left-teen-dead-in-st-clair/article_d9ae46b2-df4d-56e6-8ada-7b8d3f3adc5c.html. 
 246. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. (noting that if someone had just committed “a misdemeanor offense and missed a 
court date or didn’t pay a fine, we didn’t want to drag them out of the neighborhood because they 
weren’t necessarily bad actors”). 
 249. Allard Interview, supra note 230; Mann, supra note 245. 
 250. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] FIXING THE UNFIXABLE 187 
length with offenders to understand the circumstances that led to the criminal 
behavior.251 Since that time, prosecutors have continued the direct engagement 
by routinely walking door-to-door in the neighborhood, coordinating with the 
county’s animal control department to provide free animal vaccinations, and 
even handing out Christmas presents to neighborhood children.252 To 
symbolize their commitment to the neighborhood, prosecutors coordinated a 
block party in the same location where the deadly gun battle raged only months 
before.253 Residents eagerly spoke to and socialized with prosecutors, police, 
and other members of the community.254 Through these and other efforts, 
prosecutors have gone to great lengths to show Parkfield Terrace residents that 
they are eager to engage, and that criminals no longer control the 
neighborhood.255 
Although the Parkfield Project principally focuses on community 
engagement, the initiative also exemplifies the effectiveness of using non-
traditional civil remedies256 and collaborating with other agencies and 
community organizations.257 Immediately after the deadly gun battle in the 
neighborhood, St. Clair County prosecutors took an aggressive and creative 
approach to “take out as many bad actors as [they] could by using the 
traditional [case-processing] model.”258 They collaborated closely with police, 
investigated together, exchanged intelligence, and brainstormed strategies to 
build the best possible cases against each of the defendants.259 Despite this 
success, both prosecutors and the police recognized that crime would slowly 
“creep[] back into the neighborhood” unless they used other innovative tactics 
to supplement the traditional approach.260 
Prosecutors created a task force to remake and rebuild Parkfield Terrace 
because they recognized the situation presented an opportunity to fill the 
vacuum left when prosecutors displaced the criminals who “continually 
wreak[ed] havoc in the neighborhood.”261 State and local police increased 
 
 251. Id. 
 252. Allard Interview, supra note 230. 
 253. Id. (noting that only months before, “most people would not stand [in the neighborhood 
at night] without a bullet proof vest on and a large army around [them].”). 
 254. Id. (“Old, young, white, black . . . policemen, firemen, people who were unemployed, 
people who had jobs . . . the whole community came together for the first time.”). 
 255. Since the gun battle in March 2011, crime has gone down significantly in the 
neighborhood, as symbolized by the fact that hundreds of people “[could] have a neighborhood 
block party on a summer night in the exact place where gun fights routinely occurred only months 
before.” Allard Interview, supra note 230. 
 256. See Doolan, supra note 35, at 560–61. 
 257. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 354. 
 258. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 259. Id.; see also WOLF & WORRALL, supra note 93, at 45. 
 260. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 261. Id. 
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patrols and conducted warrant sweeps.262 The United States Attorney’s Office 
and other federal authorities provided resources and investigative support.263 
Parole and probation officials clamped down on past offenders.264 Code 
enforcement officials issued citations for violations, towed abandoned 
vehicles, and eventually demolished scores of houses.265 After prosecutors and 
their partners ridded the neighborhood of as many criminal elements as 
possible, they then recruited local businesses and social service organizations 
to provide services, support, and the resources necessary to engage directly 
with residents.266 
Although prosecutors still have work to do, the Parkfield Project represents 
a classic case of how effective prosecutors can be when they realize that 
traditional case-processing represents only one element of effective 
prosecution.267 Prior to the implementation of a targeted community 
prosecution strategy in Parkfield Terrace, the neighborhood was “a cesspool of 
thugs”268 where violence occurred frequently and “utility workers [did not] 
venture without a police escort.”269 Now “things are quiet” in Parkfield 
Terrace, and residents can walk down the street for the first time without 
worrying about hearing gunshots.270 The number of reports of “shots fired” 
dropped precipitously after the initial crime sweep and has remained low ever 
since.271 So far, the community prosecution approach in Parkfield Terrace has 
been an unequivocal success. 
Recognizing this success, St. Clair County prosecutors developed the 
county-wide “3-D Prosecution Strategy” to apply the approach used in 
Parkfield Terrace to other areas of the county.272 Since crime occurs with some 
predictability by a “certain group of people, at a certain time, and often in 
certain places,”273 prosecutors aimed to disrupt, dislocate, and deter potential 
criminals before they commit crimes.274 First, prosecutors disrupt crime by 
cleaning up abandoned neighborhoods of derelict housing through code 
enforcement, demolition, and other civil remedies.275 Second, they dislocate 
 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Allard Interview, supra note 230. 
 267. See Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 268. Mann, supra note 245. 
 269. Id. (quoting St. Clair County Sheriff Mearl Justus). 
 270. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Allard Interview, supra note 230. 
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past offenders by working with probation officers to “control where [past 
offenders] can be, when they can be there, and who they can be there with.”276 
However, during the implementation of the dislocation strategy, prosecutors 
quickly realized that police on patrol did not have the tools to play a role in 
dislocating criminals. Thus, prosecutors established protocols to ensure that 
every arm of the criminal justice system—prosecutors, police, probation, and 
parole—shared intelligence and could easily access it in the field.277 Finally, as 
the third arm of the strategy, prosecutors deter criminals through traditional 
case-processing methods. By disrupting, dislocating, and deterring potential 
criminals in a comprehensive problem-solving strategy, prosecutors have 
instilled an ethos of crime prevention in every step of the criminal justice 
process. 
St. Clair County prosecutors realize that none of their innovative strategies 
can be used in a vacuum, and they must continually develop new programs to 
build upon their early successes.278 State’s Attorney Kelly believes that each 
idea must be “combined together to change the way prosecutors think and the 
way [they] do their jobs.”279 To that end, prosecutors have envisioned a new 
initiative, the Offender Accountability Program, as an alternative prosecution 
method that will allow offenders of low-level crimes to attend skills-based 
classes on how to obtain and keep a valid drivers’ license or vehicle insurance, 
and how to search for and find a job.280 The program deviates far from the 
traditional case-processing model, but prosecutors believe the initiative will 
have a “ripple effect throughout the community.”281 Similarly, Kelly has 
shifted more prosecutors to the office’s Child Support Division and Domestic 
Violence Unit because problems in the home eventually spill out into the 
community.282 Since adopting a more holistic, community approach to criminal 
justice, St. Clair County prosecutors have realized that seemingly disparate 
social elements are inextricably linked and affect broader social problems that 
threaten the entire community.283 
 
 276. Allard Interview, supra note 230. St. Clair County prosecutors implemented their 3-D 
Prosecution Strategy by specifically targeting high crime areas in East St. Louis and by limiting 
or restricting past offenders’ ability to travel to certain public housing projects, night clubs, and 
neighborhoods. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. Prosecutors in Portland, Oregon, laid the 
groundwork for this innovative method. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 277. Kelly Interview, supra note 13 (“If police don’t have the necessary information to 
enforce conditions of parole and probation, the system isn’t effective . . . by placing strict 
conditions upon offenders and arming police with the information, we can control where and 
when [a] person can be in a location and who they can be there with.”). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Allard Interview, supra note 230. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Kelly Interview, supra note 13. 
 283. Id. 
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VIII.  APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER AREAS OF ST. CLAIR 
COUNTY TO EAST ST. LOUIS 
Although prosecutors have achieved considerable success by applying 
elements of community prosecution throughout St. Clair County, they have yet 
to specifically target East St. Louis with their innovative strategies.284 
Prosecutors recognize that the city desperately needs innovative solutions to 
fix the city’s embedded crime and social problems.285 Thus, they are currently 
brainstorming specific strategies and tactics in which they can apply their 
community prosecution approach in the city.286 They plan to replicate the 
success of the Parkfield Project by using code enforcement and nuisance 
abatement.287 They will partner with other law enforcement agencies to 
conduct probation and parole sweeps to dislocate bad actors, as they did 
successfully in Parkfield Terrace.288 As part of the county-wide 3-D 
Prosecution Strategy, they will use special conditions of bond to disrupt prior 
offenders before they commit a crime.289 Through the envisioned Offender 
Accountability Program, they will offer alternative punishment options to 
offenders of low-level crime.290 Finally, prosecutors have already started 
engaging with East St. Louis residents by knocking on doors, meeting with 
community leaders, and working with citizens to create unique community-
based solutions.291 
Notably, St. Clair County prosecutors understand that East St. Louis will 
offer unique challenges in implementing community prosecution because the 
city sits in a “league of its own” in the category of serious crime.292 
Prosecutors recognize the problem of extraordinary violent crime in the city’s 
federal housing projects.293 To combat this problem, State’s Attorney Kelly has 
worked closely with United States Attorney Stephen Wigginton to focus 
resources, investigations, and prevention efforts to combat the underlying 
problems that cause violent crime in the housing projects.294 They have also 
pressured the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
increase safety measures and control within and around these entities.295 To 
ensure the success of future community prosecution strategies, Kelly and 
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Wigginton must continue these and other problem-solving efforts to address 
the circumstances and roots of violent crime in East St. Louis. 
St. Clair County prosecutors must also address the deep and endemic 
corruption underlying the city’s widely known dysfunction.296 The city’s 
corruption, particularly within the police department, will hinder the success of 
any community-based movement that relies upon trust and open 
communication with citizens.297 Moreover, given that successful community 
prosecution initiatives require close collaboration amongst every branch of law 
enforcement,298 St. Clair County prosecutors must take drastic measures to 
restore integrity and accountability to the East St. Louis Police Department. 
State’s Attorney Kelly and United States Attorney Wigginton have 
publicly condemned the corruption and collaborated on strategies to address 
it.299 In fact, at the urging of Kelly and Wigginton, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn 
recently signed legislation creating the Metro East Police Commission, which 
will set standards, promote better practices, and carry the authority to use tax 
increment financing district revenue to hire more officers in East St. Louis and 
surrounding communities.300 Governor Quinn, Kelly, and Wigginton should be 
applauded for their efforts to instill new accountability measures within the 
East St. Louis Police Department. 
But St. Clair County prosecutors must do more. Previous state 
government-led commissions have utterly failed to fix the problems in East St. 
Louis.301 Furthermore, given the state’s track record in managing its own 
government,302 East St. Louis residents should be skeptical that a new layer of 
state bureaucracy will have the desired effect. Professor Theising argues that 
leaders must “tear down” the ineffective, corrupt governmental institutions in 
 
 296. See THEISING, supra note 14, at 187–93 (describing a history of modern corruption in 
East St. Louis rooted in organized crime, machine politics, and rampant patronage). 
 297. See Thompson, supra note 8, at 348. 
 298. Gray, supra note 2, at 201. 
 299. Nicholas J.C. Pistor, Seven Arrests Stem from Crackdown on Bad Cops, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Sept. 23, 2011, at A2 (noting that Kelly announced that his office and federal 
authorities had begun working more closely together to pool resources and continue 
investigations into police corruption throughout the county, including East St. Louis). See also 
Carolyn P. Smith, Sting Operation Nabs Baxton Stealing Xbox Game Consoles, BELLEVILLE 
NEWS-DEMOCRAT, Jan. 20, 2012, at A1, (noting that Kelly previously expressed concerns about 
the credibility of the former East St. Louis police indicted under a federal corruption sting). 
 300. Marlon A. Walker, Quinn Sends Backup to Metro East Police, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 17, 2012, at A3. 
 301. HAMER, supra note 16, at 50–51; see supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text. 
 302. June 2012 Illinois Auditor General’s Report found that Illinois has the poorest fiscal 
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Illinois in Poorest Fiscal Condition of All States, CHI. TRIB. (JUNE 21, 2012) http://articles.chica 
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East St. Louis, and the commission is an important first step in that process.303 
However, by itself, a top-down, state-led approach will not address the 
endemic social and economic issues that plague the city. To fix the underlying 
problem in the long term, prosecutors must engage community members and 
build citizen-led institutions to take the place of the current failing 
institutions.304 
IX.  APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM OTHER COMMUNITY PROSECUTION 
PROGRAMS TO EAST ST. LOUIS 
Given the extraordinary problems in East St. Louis, St. Clair County 
prosecutors must consider implementing the most radical community 
prosecution approaches that have been successful in other cities across the 
country. If they only apply the strategies and tactics used in other parts of St. 
Clair County, prosecutors will likely see limited success. However, given that 
the city’s failed institutions have halted reform measures numerous times in the 
past,305 prosecutors must not be afraid to adopt the most innovative strategies 
to challenge the traditional prosecutorial model and rebuild East St. Louis. 
To achieve the greatest level of success in East St. Louis, St. Clair County 
prosecutors must engage directly with residents by “deploying prosecutors . . . 
[directly] into the community” to identify citizen concerns and invite 
participation.306 While prosecutors have spent some time speaking with East 
St. Louis residents already, prosecutors should engage in a more 
comprehensive effort to go door-to-door in every neighborhood.307 Although 
some community members will initially be skeptical, citizens will eventually 
express their concerns openly and “[speak] at great length about the need for 
targeting [a specific neighborhood problem].”308 This will allow prosecutors to 
develop specific interventions aimed at addressing the problem identified.309 
Prosecutors must then focus on the problem and see its solution through to 
fruition. The initial success achieved in solving a specific problem will give 
prosecutors credibility, which will breed a greater sense of involvement and 
cooperation among community members.310 The successful efforts in Parkfield 
Terrace illustrate this important concept.311 
 
 303. THEISING, supra note 14, at 203; see supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text. 
 304. THEISING, supra note 14, at 202–03; see supra notes 217–22 and accompanying text. 
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When prosecutors gain the initial trust of East St. Louis residents, they 
then must establish open and enduring channels of communication to allow 
citizens to share their honest concerns through direct community input.312 By 
establishing formal community organizations, prosecutors can establish 
creative initiatives that involve citizens in the problem-solving process and 
ensure they have a stake in their success.313 By doing this, citizen input will be 
ongoing, which will help provide a barometer for the success of specific 
community prosecution tactics. It will also prove to residents that community 
prosecutors are involved in a long-term problem-solving endeavor, not a short-
term fix. 
While prosecutors should create formal institutions for citizen engagement, 
they also must engage with existing community organizations in East St. 
Louis—particularly those that have strong and active citizen participation such 
as churches and neighborhood groups.314 East St. Louis residents have lived 
through the ups and downs of life in an abandoned city, so they are acutely 
aware of the city’s problems.315 Community prosecutors must “avoid feeling as 
though they are the solution, have the solution, or even know what problems 
need solutions.”316 Prosecutors should see themselves as a “conduit or a 
liaison” between the East St. Louis community and the criminal justice system, 
rather than part of the solution.317 By taking this perspective, prosecutors will 
be less likely to make assumptions about the nature of the community or the 
likely views of East St. Louis residents.318 
In order to avoid believing that they have all the solutions, St. Clair County 
prosecutors must ensure they obtain input from all segments of the East St. 
Louis community, including those citizens who are not as visible or as well 
organized.319 Constructing formal methods of engagement that target diverse 
segments of the community will ensure that a broad range of East St. Louis 
residents take part in the movement and have a stake in its success.320 Given 
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the history of racial conflict and widespread lack of trust in law enforcement 
that permeates East St. Louis,321 prosecutors must do everything possible to 
obtain input from a wide array of city residents. The prosecutors cannot only 
engage with the most visible citizens who have the courage to come to the door 
when a prosecutor knocks. St. Clair County prosecutors must work with the 
East St. Louis community, not for the most accessible residents. Thus, they 
must establish targeted methods to spur participation throughout the 
community.322 
Even though the leadership in the St. Clair County State’s Attorney’s 
Office has widely accepted the philosophy of community prosecution, they 
should take measures to ensure further integration of the philosophy 
throughout the entire office.323 Assigning prosecutors to work exclusively on 
community prosecution efforts could accomplish this goal and lead to more 
comprehensive problem-solving efforts specifically targeted to East St. 
Louis.324 In some limited cases, prosecutors in other cities have chosen to go 
even further by integrating community prosecution throughout the office.325 
Under this approach, prosecutors only handle cases that arise out of their 
assigned neighborhood district or specific police precinct.326 Implementing a 
comprehensive community prosecution approach, such as this, would represent 
a paradigm-shifting strategy to tackle the embedded problems in East St. 
Louis. 
While St. Clair County prosecutors should consider the more radical 
approaches implemented in other cities, resource constraints may limit the 
County’s ability to develop separate community prosecution units or adopt 
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comprehensive programs.327 St. Clair County prosecutors should follow the 
lead of prosecutors across the country who have overcome the hurdle of 
resources by soliciting federal and state grants,328 developing private 
partnerships,329 and funding community prosecution efforts by the revenue 
generated through asset forfeiture proceedings.330 
At minimum, St. Clair County prosecutors must restructure their office to 
ensure East St. Louis residents have increased access to prosecutors in some 
form, thereby giving community members an opportunity to relay their 
concerns and other forms of input.331 At the same time, managing prosecutors 
must ensure assistant prosecutors have a sufficient understanding of the unique 
culture, environment, and problems of East St. Louis—so they are able to 
develop unique solutions consistent with the community prosecution 
philosophy.332 St. Clair County’s acceptance of the community prosecution 
model represents an important first step in solving the crisis in East St. Louis. 
But to truly fix the deep problems in the city, prosecutors must be willing to 
expand and deepen their commitment to community prosecution. 
St. Clair County must also consider strategies to develop more sustained 
collaboration with local police officials in East St. Louis. Prosecutors have 
already successfully collaborated with other law enforcement partners in ways 
that likely would not have occurred under the traditional case-processing 
model.333 However, given the severity of problems in East St. Louis, 
prosecutors will not be successful unless they deepen that collaboration. A St. 
Clair County prosecutor could be assigned to work with local police out of a 
police precinct, a storefront, or a housing project in East St. Louis.334 By 
working side-by-side with local police, the East St. Louis community 
prosecutor could advise officers on how to make better cases against criminals, 
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update them on changes in the law, and offer immediate counsel in a time of 
need.335 
St. Clair County prosecutors must also deepen and broaden their 
cooperation with federal law enforcement officials. If prosecutors work with 
federal law enforcement to address targeted problems within East St. Louis, 
they can help federal officials bring charges, enhance federal charges, or 
lengthen federal sentences for the most serious offenders.336 A St. Clair County 
prosecutor could even serve in a dual role with county and federal authorities, 
which would institutionalize cross-agency linkages and ensure further 
collaboration.337 By challenging the traditional model of confined law 
enforcement roles, prosecutors can ensure that their efforts focus on solving 
systemic crime problems in East St. Louis, rather than merely shuffling 
defendants through the justice system. 
St. Clair County’s innovative programs, particularly the 3-D Prosecution 
Strategy, typify their new approach to criminal justice,338 but prosecutors must 
take a truly “global approach” that stretches beyond a “myopic focus on 
individual criminal transgressions.”339 With that goal in mind, St. Clair County 
prosecutors must focus on addressing the underlying circumstances that lead 
offenders—particularly youth and adolescents—to commit crimes in the 
future. Prosecutors should partner with East St. Louis schools to create 
educational and mentor programs that are designed to teach youth about gangs, 
drugs, and the dangers of gun violence.340 The St. Clair County Jail already has 
a successful program where county inmates help rehabilitate troubled 
teenagers,341 but county officials could expand the program by implementing a 
version of it within East St. Louis public schools. By looking beyond their 
individual cases in the courtroom, prosecutors can brainstorm other ideas to 
target at-risk youth and begin to attack the social circumstances that have led to 
the endemic cycle of crime in East St. Louis.342 
Although the community prosecution model necessarily requires a flexible 
understanding of success, St. Clair County prosecutors must create an 
evaluative model that recognizes the fundamental change in the vision and 
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goals of community prosecution.343 Conventional modes of evaluation—
principally, a prosecuting office’s conviction rate—will not adequately assess 
successful achievements in the community.344 However, given that community 
prosecution requires experimental strategies and the use of non-traditional 
tools, prosecutors must develop other concrete standards of measurement to 
ensure the strategies are working.345 Prosecutors must consider these standards 
generally—have crime rates gone down in the city?—but also based on the 
location where a particular strategy is targeted—do residents feel safer? 
Importantly, prosecutors must always realize that they are dealing with a 
dynamic, fluid environment where one cannot anticipate the set of problems 
that will plague a neighborhood or community.346 Thus, St. Clair County 
prosecutors must develop formal mechanisms to allow East St. Louis residents 
to give feedback and play a role in revising particular strategies. Through 
sustained engagement with the community, prosecutors can ensure their efforts 
adequately address the concerns of city residents and affect the ultimate goal of 
rebuilding and restoring order in East St. Louis. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
Outside a city council meeting in February 2011 where city leaders once 
again slashed funding to the local police department, an East St. Louis resident 
and pastor at a local church cogently described the current state of affairs in the 
city: “You know the saying, ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it?’ Well, it’s broke.”347 
This resident said what has become obvious to anyone who has driven through 
East St. Louis, read about the city’s immense crime and poverty, or listened to 
a community member tell his story of being afraid to walk the streets: East St. 
Louis is broken. Sadly, East St. Louis has exemplified an abandoned industrial 
city for decades, and yet the city’s problems have only gotten worse in recent 
years. Realizing that traditional approaches have done nothing to stem the 
increase in crime and poverty, some have resigned themselves to defeat and 
declared East St. Louis unfixable. 
But East St. Louis can be fixed. If leaders engage in innovative and 
proactive problem solving, they can develop solutions that address the long-
term, embedded problems of the city. Developed out of the community 
policing movement and broken windows theory of crime prevention, the 
community prosecution philosophy challenges the traditional reactive case-
processing model and aims to address the root causes of crime. While 
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community prosecutors recognize the importance of adjudicating cases after 
crime occurs, they emphasize the importance of preventing crime and building 
social order before crime occurs. By taking an innovative, problem-solving 
approach to crime, community prosecutors recognize deeper social problems 
and the underlying circumstances that give rise to crime. To address these core 
problems, community prosecutors focus on engaging with the community, 
using non-traditional legal tools, increasing collaboration with community and 
law enforcement partners, and invigorating community development. 
By challenging the traditional model, community prosecutors have 
emerged as essential leaders with the goal of rebuilding broken and abandoned 
communities similar to East St. Louis. As the St. Louis Post-Dispatch said in 
2003: “The only real hope [for East St. Louis] is for good people to answer the 
cry for competent leadership.”348 St. Clair County prosecutors have answered 
that call by adopting a new community prosecution philosophy. Prosecutors 
should apply the approach’s successful strategies, tactics, and tools to East St. 
Louis, so residents can show the skeptics for themselves: East St. Louis can be 
fixed. 
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